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MID-ATLANTIC  ETHICS  COMMITTEE
N E W S L E T T E R
WHY ADVANCES IN TREATING THOSE 
WITH BRAIN INJURIES REQUIRE 
ADVANCES IN RESPECTING THEIR RIGHTS 
The Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee 
Newsletter is a publication of the 
Maryland Health Care Ethics 
Committee Network, an initiative of 
the University of Maryland Francis 
King Carey School of Law’s Law & 
Health Care Program. The Newsletter 
combines educational articles with 
timely information about bioethics 
activities. Each issue includes a feature 
article, a Calendar of upcoming 
events, and a case presentation and 
commentary by local experts in 
bioethics, law, medicine, nursing, or 
related disciplines.  
 
 Diane E. Hoffmann, JD, MS - Editor
Several years ago a father approached 
me, concerned about the care his son 
was receiving. The son had been in a 
car accident that left him with severe 
brain injury. He was placed in a nursing 
home, and his dad stopped by regularly 
to check in on him. The father feared 
his son was being ignored or, worse, 
left in pain or distress.
I could feel the love he had for his 
son – and his hurt. His boy was so 
vulnerable.
Over the past two decades, I have 
worked as an academic physician in 
the field of neuroethics, focused on 
advancing the care of patients with 
severe brain injury and bringing the 
fruits of neuroscience to a very marginalized population. I have chronicled my work, 
and that of my colleagues, in Rights Come to Mind: Brain Injury, Ethics and the 
Struggle for Consciousness,  which was published by Cambridge University Press in 
2015. To write that book, I interviewed more than 50 families who have been touched 
by severe brain injury. Their stories of incredible highs and lows take them to the edge 
of endurance. What they have told me would make you weep.
Yet now, with the last-minute passage of the 21st Century Cures Act in the prior 
Congress, there is something more we can do for patients with severe brain injury 
because it provides US$1.5 billion for brain research. Through the National Institutes 
of Health’s Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnologies 
(BRAIN) Initiative, the 21st Century Cures Act can bring to life additional science for 
this underserved population.
The struggle for rehabilitation
Traumatic brain injuries [TBIs] account for 2.5 million emergency room visits 
each year. Nearly 90 percent are evaluated and released (for example, many patients 
This article was reprinted with permission from the January 26, 2017 issue of The 
Conversation, http://theconversation.com.
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The information in this newsletter
is not intended to provide legal 
advice or opinion and should not be 
acted upon without consulting an 
attorney.
with concussion), but almost 300,000 
with more serious injury need 
hospitalization. For those who are 
most gravely injured, their journey 
can begin with brilliant, lifesaving 
neurosurgical care that would have 
been lost a few decades ago when I 
was a medical student. 
In New York state, for example, 
death rates for severe TBI dropped 
from 22 percent to 13 percent from 
2001 to 2009. Over that time, doctors 
began to respond to brain swelling 
more effectively by shunting off spinal 
fluid and even removing part of the 
skull to let the injured brain expand 
and then recover. These interventions 
have been a game-changer and saved 
countless lives.
But after gratitude for a life that 
has been saved, the truly difficult part 
begins. Patients and families face a 
slow-paced and often fickle recovery. 
Tragically, this phase is often made 
more challenging by the burden of 
poorly designed insurance coverage. 
Families struggle to get their loved 
ones needed rehabilitation. If they 
do get rehabilitation, it is often too 
short to make a difference. Indeed, if 
patients are too slow to demonstrate 
improvement, services can be cut 
off because of stringent “medical 
necessity” admission criteria, often 
from third-party insurers.
This cutoff makes no sense. As I 
argued with colleagues in the Journal 
of Law Medicine and Ethics, if we 
don’t know how long it takes the 
injured brain to heal, how do we 
know the pace is too slow? In the 
end, the vast majority are placed in 
a nursing home or institution, which 
is euphemistically called “custodial 
care.” Fewer than 15 percent of people 
with moderate to severe TBI get in-
patient rehabilitation.
Can rights come to mind?
For years, we thought this was the 
end of the story. These patients were 
deprived of skilled and sustained 
rehabilitation because we thought 
there was no hope. But in the last 
decade, neuroscience has made great 
breakthroughs in our understanding 
of the brain and its resilience. 
With proper and state-of-the-art 
rehabilitation, 21 percent of the most 
grievously injured can achieve 
functional independence. That might 
not seem like a big number, but no 
one would have predicted this when 
these people rolled into the emergency 
room. But with devoted care and 
sustained rehabilitation, this level of 
recovery was achieved.
One of the most distressing 
realizations has been that many 
patients who are thought to be 
permanently unconscious or vegetative 
– and thus ignored and neglected – are 
in fact conscious and aware. In fact, 
one study found that two out of every 
five patients in nursing homes who 
have a traumatic brain injury and are 
thought to be vegetative were actually 
conscious when carefully assessed. It 
is a staggering error rate, which would 
be unthinkable if we were talking 
about making a credible diagnosis of 
heart disease or cancer.
Recent studies using neuroimaging 
of the brain have revealed this 
powerfully in patients who appear 
vegetative but are in fact minimally 
conscious. For these patients there 
is a disconnect between thought and 
action. Patients demonstrate conscious 
responses on their scans but don’t 
show external or behavioral evidence 
of awareness on clinical examination. 
It is understandable that the 
diagnosis can be missed. That’s the 
more innocent explanation. And it 
can be mitigated with more thorough, 
and repeated, assessments. More 
nefariously, many clinicians look 
at these patients and assume that 
they aren’t there, acculturated by 
preconceptions and their biases.
Either way, this is consequential 
and more than just a misdiagnosis. 
Labeling someone as permanently 
unconscious becomes a label and a 
prison. These people are locked away 
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from the rest of us because they are 
mistakenly thought to be unconscious 
when they are not.
What does it mean to write these 
people off? What does it mean 
to mark a patient as permanently 
unconscious when he is in fact aware 
and in the room? Imagine what it 
must be like to lie in a nursing home 
bed and be ignored as if you weren’t 
there, estranged from your family and 
the broader human community. Could 
anything be more isolating?
New treatments bring new hope
To be sure, we don’t want to be 
overly optimistic about anyone’s 
prospects. For many, pessimism 
may be justified, but increasingly, 
progress in neuroscience is making 
it possible for us to identify patients 
who are able to make recoveries once 
thought impossible and to help their 
brains recover. This is more than a 
pipe dream as new drugs, devices and 
neuroimaging are starting to bring 
some patients back from the abyss. 
For example, a flu drug has been 
shown to accelerate the recovery of 
consciousness; deep brain stimulation 
has demonstrated the ability to restore 
functional communication in a proof 
of principle clinical trial in which I 
was involved as a coinvestigator to 
a patient in the minimally conscious 
state; and neuroimaging is peering 
into the disconnect between thought 
and behavior and helping patients 
communicate who otherwise couldn’t. 
This is still early research, but the 
science is incredibly promising. And 
this makes the challenges posed 
by insurance barriers all the more 
troubling. 
It suggests we cannot think of this 
as simply a health care financing 
question, but something deeper and 
more fundamental. To me, it’s a 
civil rights issue and one that gets 
to the core of whom we value and 
who counts. When these people are 
misdiagnosed and ignored, they 
become invisible. I fear they simply 
don’t count.
Just as we have worked to 
mainstream kids with Down 
syndrome or autism and worked to 
better integrate them into society 
instead of institutionalizing them, 
we must do the same for those with 
traumatic brain injuries. We need 
to reintegrate them back into their 
communities and develop the tools 
that will help them recover.
Many people see the 21st 
Century Cures Act as a boon for 
medical research, but I also see it as 
legislation that will help realize the 
civil rights of people with severe 
brain injury. With new understanding 
and better neurotechnologies, we 
can help patients communicate and 
reengage with their world.
The long arc of justice demands 
nothing less for citizens with 
severe brain injury. At a time of 
deep national division, the care of 
people with severe brain injury is 
something we can all rally around. 
This collective responsibility speaks 
to fundamental American values.
Joe Fins, MD, MACP
The E. William Davis, Jr., M.D. 
Professor of Medical Ethics and 
Professor of Medicine
Chief Division of Medical Ethics 
Weill Cornell Medicine
Solomon Center Distinguished 
Scholar in Medicine, Bioethics and 
the Law, Yale Law School, Cornell 
University 
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MORAL CASE DELIBERATION: FACILITATING A STRUCTURED 
DIALOGUE WITH INVOLVED STAKEHOLDERS
Facilitation of moral case 
deliberation (MCD) is a relatively new 
form of clinical ethics support (CES) 
that is rather unknown in the U.S. but 
is getting increasing attention within 
Europe (especially the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Sweden) (Stolper et 
al., 2015; Molewijk, Slowther & 
Aulisio, 2016). In MCD, health care 
professionals (physicians, nurses, 
social workers, etc.), managers, 
family, and/or patients discuss a moral 
question derived from a concrete 
clinical case with a trained and 
certified MCD facilitator (Molewijk 
et al., 2008).  Abma and colleagues 
(2009) identified four main goals of 
MCD: 
1. to reflect upon a case and to 
define and improve the quality 
of care within that case; 
2. to reflect on what it means to 
be a good professional and to 
enhance a professional’s moral 
competencies;
3. to improve multidisciplinary 
team cooperation and to let 
teams deal with disagreement in 
a (more) constructive way; and 
4. to use insights from MCDs in 
order to develop, adjust and 
implement institutional policies 
and/or guidelines. 
MCD can be organized ad hoc (upon 
request), on a structural basis (e.g. 
every month one MCD at the ward) 
or planned within a specific project. 
For example, say CES staff are asked 
to help staff at a mental health care 
institution to reflect upon the use of 
coercion (e.g., chemical and physical 
restraints). They may use MCD within 
this project to help staff reflect upon 
moral reasons for the use of coercion.
How does MCD differ from ethics 
consultation? Abma and colleagues 
(2009, p. 219) write: “… the ASBH 
taskforce on the Core Competencies 
for Health Care Ethics Consultation 
describes a more procedural and 
expert approach of the ethics 
consultant when discussing ‘the ethics 
facilitation approach.’” One of the 
central goals of the ethics consultant 
is to answer the question, ‘‘Who is the 
appropriate decision maker within this 
concrete situation?’’ in a morally and 
legally right way. When responding 
to ethics case consultation within 
this approach, the ethics consultant 
“focuses more on the answer of the 
question ‘What is [emphasis added] 
morally right?’ In contrast, the 
MCD facilitator focuses more on the 
systematic reflection upon the way 
MCD participants reason about what 
they think is morally right. The MCD 
facilitator can also ask about or refer 
to existing policies, regulations and 
laws (but specific knowledge about 
these existing policies, regulations and 
laws is not a formal requirement for 
the MCD facilitator). As Stolper and 
colleagues (2016, p. 3) summarize: 
“Some key principles of MCD are:
1. [using] experience as a starting 
point for moral reflection; 
2. tak[ing] into account variations 
related to interpretations and 
appreciations of facts by the 
participants of MCD plus the 
conclusions drawn by them;
3. linking the values and norms of 
the participants to concrete facts 
in the case; and 
4. [using] dialogue as a process 
and product in which knowledge 
and practical wisdom [emerge 
and are] fleshed out by learning 
by doing.” 
All MCD sessions are structured 
by a specific conversation method. 
One example is the Socratic Dialogue 
method (Steinkamp & Gordijn, 2003). 
Another is the Dilemma method 
(Stolper et al., 2016). Procedural 
components of the latter are listed 
in Table 1. Within MCD, ethical 
issues are not defined beforehand; the 
definition of ‘the’ ethical issue or ‘the’ 
key moral question is a result of a 
structured reflective process focusing 
on the experiences and viewpoints of 
the MCD participants. This is because 
the MCD facilitator is aware of the 
fact that defining the moral issue is 
itself a normative process that requires 
critical inquiry. In MCD, the moral 
problem under consideration is always 
a concrete moral issue, experienced 
by one of the participants. This issue 
is presented as a case (for example, 
concerning a treatment decision for 
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an individual patient). The case 
is analyzed, not by deductively 
applying general moral concepts or 
principles, but by investigating values 
and norms of the stakeholders in the 
case. The facilitator, who could be 
described as a Socratic guide de-
constructing conclusions and related 
presuppositions of MCD participants, 
aims to stimulate reflection on both 
personal moral experiences and 
considerations, and similarities and 
discrepancies among the views and 
experiences of other participants in 
the MCD (Stolper et al, 2016).
MCD emphasizes the variation 
in thoughts and experiences of 
health care professionals. In MCD, 
different viewpoints are examined 
and scrutinized. The initial aim is 
not to decide which perspective or 
answer is morally right, but to ask 
open and critical questions in order 
to elaborate assumptions behind 
the perspective, and find out how 
it is applicable to the case at hand. 
When one of the participants brings 
in an ethical notion, for instance the 
concept of autonomy, the focus will 
be on examining what autonomy 
means for this person in this case, 
and why it is regarded as important 
for this person. This may result in a 
deliberation on various interpretations 
of autonomy, and their relevance 
for the argumentation with respect 
to the dilemma in the case (Stolper 
et al, 2016). In the end, if the MCD 
participants aim for a final decision 
or answer, then the MCD facilitates 
the MCD participants in the process 
of weighing pros and cons of various 
actions in order to let the group make 
their final decision (or compromise).
Finally, the MCD facilitator usually 
does not give substantial advice and 
does not function as an expert of a 
specific ethics subject. This does 
not mean that the MCD facilitator 
does not need any ethics expertise 
and that he\she is merely focusing 
on communication or mediation 
(Metselaar et al., 2015). The 
expertise of the facilitator consists 
of, among other things, fostering a 
sincere and constructive dialogue 
among the participants (aiming at a 
moral inquiry instead of leading a 
discussion about the question ‘Who is 
right?’), keeping an eye on the moral 
dimensions of the case, supporting 
the quality of a joint moral reasoning 
process, and helping the group in 
planning actions in order to improve 
the quality of patient care. In the 
end, MCD is not a substitute for 
clinical ethics consultation or ethics 
committee deliberations: all three 
CES mechanisms can be used for 
different purposes.
For those interested in learning 
more about MCD, an international 
intensive training for becoming an 
MCD facilitator is being offered in 
Amsterdam January 7-10, 2018. For 
more information, contact the author 
at b.molewijk@vumc.nl. 
Bert Molewijk, RN, PhD 
Associate professor clinical ethics 
support & coordinator European 
Clinical Ethics Support (ECEN)
Department of Medical Humanities, 
VU University medical centre 
(VUmc), APH (Quality of Care), 
Amsterdam, the Netherlands &
Centre for Medical Ethics, Institute 
of Health and Society, Faculty of 
Medicine, University of Oslo, 
P.O. Box 1130, Blindern NO-0318, 
Oslo, Norway
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Procedural components of the Dilemma Method for moral case deliberation (MCD) (Stolper et al., 2016) 
include:
1. MCD facilitator introduces self and participants and explains the goals, expectations, and process of 
MCD, including note-taking and confidentiality of notes;
2. Case presenter presents his/her case briefly, using concrete facts;
3. Case presenter formulates her/his core dilemma according 
to the following format: Should I do A or B?
4. Participants ask questions for clarification in order to 
imagine what it means to be in that situation so that later 
on in the MCD they can answer the dilemma question for 
themselves.
5. Facilitator constructs table identifying ‘present 
perspectives/persons,’ ‘values,’ and ‘norms/rules/actions.’ 
Asks each participant to describe his/her core values and 
norms with respect to the dilemma question. Connects 
values/norms to original dilemma (A or B).
6. Facilitator lists possible alternatives (without discussing feasibility).
7. Participants write down on paper the following answers for themselves:
(a) I think the right thing to do is . . .
(b) Because . . .
(c) Therefore I’m not able to do . . .
(d) How can I cope with or decrease the moral loss related to the other side of the dilemma?
(e) Which virtues and actions are necessary to do the right thing?
8. Participants reflect upon possible group consensus or decision:
(a) What are remarkable points of consensus and disagreement? What kind of underlying questions
does that raise?
(b) Given the points mentioned, which answer to the dilemma is possible for the moment?
(c) If there is any substantial disagreement: how should we deal with that?
9. Facilitator schedules follow-up appointments and plans date and place to evaluate those appointments 
and to identify closure of MCD. Summary of notes provided to participants.
10. Participants evaluate (through discussion and by questionnaire) the MCD. What about the process? Have 
we met our goals? What could be improved the next time?
TABLE 1. THE DILEMMA METHOD FOR  
MORAL CASE DELIBERATION (MCD)
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The Society of Critical Care 
Medicine’s ethics committee 
recently issued a policy statement 
on defining futile and potentially 
inappropriate interventions (Kon, 
et al., 2016a). This policy statement 
clarifies a prior multi-society policy 
statement (Bosslet, et al., 2015) 
that recommended only using the 
term medically futile to refer to 
interventions that have no physiologic 
chance of achieving a desired goal, 
such as antibiotics to treat viral 
infections. 
The more recent policy statement 
goes into more detail regarding the 
appropriate goals of intensive care 
unit (ICU) care (i.e., “treatment that 
provides a reasonable expectation for 
survival outside the acute care setting 
with sufficient cognitive ability to 
perceive the benefits of treatment” 
and goals of “palliative care that 
provides comfort to patients through 
the dying process”). Further guidance 
is provided on how case-by-case 
decisions should be made using a 
process-based approach.
A companion policy statement 
drafted by the American College 
of Critical Care Medicine and 
the American Thoracic Society 
provides additional guidance to 
ICU clinicians regarding shared 
decision-making (SDM) in ICUs 
(Kon, et al., 2016b). SDM is defined 
as “a collaborative process that 
allows patients, or their surrogates, 
and clinicians to make healthcare 
decisions together, taking into 
account the best scientific evidence 
available, as well as the patient’s 
values, goals, and preferences.” 
Clinicians are encouraged to use 
SDM to define a patient’s overall 
goals of care and “when making 
major treatment decisions that may 
be affected by personal values, 
goals, and preferences.” Clinicians’ 
“default” approach to SDM 
should include: (1) exchanging 
information, (2) deliberating, and 
(3) making a treatment decision. 
The recommendations acknowledge 
a range of ethically supportable 
decision-making approaches (e.g., 
patient-directed, surrogate-directed, 
or clinician-directed models) that 
clinicians should select from based 
on the preferences of the patient or 
surrogate and contextual details of 
each situation. The policy statement 
includes examples of preference-
sensitive decisions in the ICU and 
key communication skills clinicians 
should master in SDM. For example, 
a patient/surrogate has the right to 
defer certain decisions to a clinician; 
this is distinct from strict paternalism 
in that in this approach to SDM, the 
clinician understands the patient’s 
values and uses them to determine the 
plan of care, and the patient/surrogate 
is offered as much information as 
desired (in understandable language) 
and recognizes that (s)he can change 
his/her mind and be supported. 
The American Thoracic Society 
also recently published policy and 
clinical recommendations for medical 
decision-making for “unbefriended” 
older adults, updating their 1996 
position statement. They call for 
policy changes to achieve more 
consistent and fair approaches 
for this population across states 
and health care delivery settings. 
Clinical recommendations include 
avoiding ad hoc approaches by 
developing standardized methods to 
make decisions for these individuals 
(particularly in urgent situations), 
considering non-traditional surrogate 
decision-makers for these individuals, 
assessing medical decision-making 
capacity systematically, ensuring 
that “patients with long-term 
incapacity have longitudinal access 
to a decision-making surrogate 
who is familiar with the patient’s 
medical condition and specific 
circumstances,” and when applying 
the best interest standard to these 
individuals, that ethics committees 
should “synthesize all available 
evidence, including cultural and 
ethnic factors” when they deliberate 
about treatment decisions (Ferrell et 
al., 2016).
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
Ethics & Research Consultant
Baltimore, MD
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POLICY STATEMENTS PROVIDE GUIDANCE FOR 
MEDICAL DECISION-MAKING
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The following case study and Dr. Levenson’s response are reprinted with permission from the Handbook for Nursing Home 
Ethics Committees, edited by Diane Hoffmann, Philip Boyle, and Steve Levenson, and published by the American Association 
of Homes and Service for the Aging in 1995. Anita Tarzian reflects on how Dr. Levenson's analysis holds up over 20 years 
later.
CASE PRESENTATION
CASE STUDY FROM A NURSING HOME
An eighty-six-year-old woman, Mrs. Green, was admitted to a nursing home because of progressive dementia due 
to Alzheimer's disease. She had never made any advance directives and was incapable of doing so. She had significant 
tardive dyskinesia—uncontrollable movements of the face and mouth—resulting from previous administration of 
psychotropic medications. She was bedbound, totally dependent in her activities of daily living, and fed via a gastrostomy 
tube. She was on Dilantin for a seizure disorder. She was alert, but only made some incoherent noises in response to 
questions. Her family stated that while she had never made an advance directive, she had previously expressed her 
wish that her life not be prolonged indefinitely by extraordinary measures. After several years in the facility with little 
change, they felt that her persistent bedbound state and limited cognitive function were not consistent with a desirable 
quality of life. They requested that her physician treat her as a terminal resident, and discontinue any aggressive medical 
interventions. Her physician agreed not to implement antibiotics, but did not think that her condition was terminal. A 
consultant physician agreed that her condition was not terminal but that not using any antibiotics would be appropriate
About six months later, she developed an abscess in her left inner thigh. Her attending physician insisted that antibiotics 
should be used to treat this, since she was not dying. At the same time, the family found out that the physician had been 
maintaining her on a long-term prophylactic dose of a urinary anti-infective. The family requested a change in physician. 
The new physician agreed not to use antibiotics and was prepared to treat her as terminally ill, but the medical director 
and other physicians in the nursing home met and decided that it was not appropriate to manage her case in this way. The 
resident's family requests an ethics committee consult. 
COMMENTS FROM A 
GERIATRICIAN
Mrs. Green was in the 
advanced stages of a progressive, 
irreversible condition. While 
she was alert, she was totally 
dependent and bedbound. There 
was no way of ascertaining if she 
was aware of her surroundings.
This case illustrates the 
difficulties of deciding on the 
appropriateness of treatment 
when a person is not terminal 
but has potentially treatable 
conditions that could hasten death 
if not treated. It also illustrates 
the difficulties of absolute 
prohibitions of a particular form 
of treatment contrasted with 
treatment in a given situation.
The family claimed that she 
had certain wishes regarding the 
use of extraordinary measures. 
Because these had never been 
documented, they could at best 
apply a substituted judgment 
standard in making decisions for her. 
If this did not seem to apply, then a 
"best interests" standard would apply.
This case is also complicated by the 
difficulties in defining terminal, and 
the problem of laws limiting treatment 
decisions to the "terminal" situation. 
[See next commentary for a discussion 
of the “end-stage” condition.] In 
Mrs. Green's case, her degenerative 
condition was advanced, but her 
death was not necessarily imminent. 
Many individuals are not necessarily 
terminal, but nevertheless have little 
hope for recovery or improvement. 
Various state laws have been, and 
should continue to be, revised to allow 
for more flexible decision making in 
cases other than terminal conditions. 
If such a law had been in effect at the 
time this case was being managed, 
it would not have been necessary to 
argue over whether the condition was 
terminal. Instead, efforts could have 
been focused on prospects for further 
general decline or improvement and 
the likelihood of any intervention 
to improve her condition or restore 
some quality of life in the face of an 
inevitably progressive condition.
The physician may have been 
deceptive in his use of prophylactic 
anti-infectives to prevent urinary 
tract infections. There had been an 
agreement not to use antibiotics, in 
anticipation of an infection that could 
eventually lead to a terminal state. 
While an anti-infective is technically 
not an antibiotic, the basic spirit of 
the agreement was not being honored. 
This decision should have been 
discussed openly with the family.
The occurrence of the abscess 
raises the issue of the absolute 
prohibition of various treatments. 
The typical prohibition against 
antibiotics is intended to prevent their 
use to aggressively treat a significant 
systemic infection (pneumonia, 
septic shock) that would otherwise 
probably progress to death. However, 
a localized abscess is not exactly the 
same as a major pneumonia or septic 
shock. In some cases, managing 
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the abscess could be considered a 
comfort measure. In any event, a 
week's course of antibiotics probably 
would have helped resolve the 
abscess, but it was not likely to 
significantly prolong this resident's 
life.
A facility ethics committee should 
review the case and consider the 
evidence. If the attending physician 
does not agree with the wishes 
of a surrogate decision maker, 
there should be a mechanism for 
changing physicians. The ethics 
committee is an appropriate forum 
for all sides—facility administration, 
medical director, other physicians, 
family, resident—to present their 
perspectives and reasons. Other 
physicians should not simply have the 
prerogative to block an appropriately 
agreed upon course of action.
In this case, an ethics committee 
could help all parties review the case 
and better understand each other's 
positions. Often, disagreements 
occur because of different starting 
premises. The various parties argue 
over conclusions but may not ever 
discuss the underlying premises 
that led them to those conclusions. 
The ethics committee can play 
an important role in getting those 
parties to focus first on these starting 
premises. If the parties cannot agree 
on the underlying premises, then the 
ethics committee should strongly 
encourage flexible decision making 
rather than a decision simply imposed 
by those with the authority to do so. 
The primary emphasis should be 
resident-centered, i.e., the potential 
benefits or drawbacks of the proposed 
interventions for the resident. Often, 
the parties can agree on the best 
clinical course, but some of them may 
fear the consequences of making a 
particular decision, based on legal or 
other considerations. Thus, the parties 
should be encouraged to think first 
about the clinical and ethical aspects 
of the case, deferring considerations 
that are self-serving (such as 
questions of legal liability). If they 
can agree on what is the best ethical 
and clinical course of action, they 
may then be able to address the legal 
concerns constructively.
If the facility does not agree 
with limitations on care, the family 
should have the option to remove the 
resident to another facility. Although 
not all circumstances can be 
anticipated, a facility's policies about 
limiting or withdrawing treatments 
should be clarified upon admission, 
rather than created on an ad hoc basis 
as cases arise. The ethics committee 
should play a major role in such 
policy clarification.
Steven A. Levenson, MD
Geriatrician
Towson, MD
COMMENTS FROM AN ETHICS 
CONSULTANT
In the above commentary, Dr. 
Levenson mentioned the value 
of state laws that don’t restrict 
decisions to withhold or withdraw 
life-prolonging interventions to 
patients in a terminal condition. 
Maryland’s Health Care Decisions 
Act (HCDA) is one such law. In 
addition to a terminal condition, it 
recognizes the “end-stage condition” 
and persistent vegetative state 
as conditions allowing a legally 
authorized decision-maker to 
withhold or withdraw life-prolonging 
interventions if consistent with 
a patient’s known wishes or best 
interests. The HCDA defines “end-
stage” condition as “an advanced, 
progressive, irreversible condition 
caused by injury, disease, or 
illness that has caused severe and 
permanent deterioration indicated 
by incompetency and complete 
physical dependency and for which, 
to a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty, treatment of the irreversible 
condition would be medically 
ineffective” [HCDA, §5–601(j)]. 
While some disability rights 
advocates have expressed concern 
that individuals who are dependent 
on others for daily care because 
of a long-standing disability may 
erroneously be designated as “end-
stage” (Carlson, Smith & Wilker, 
2012), an “end-stage” condition 
must be advanced and progressive 
and have caused severe and 
permanent deterioration, not physical 
dependency alone. In fact, the HCDA 
specifies that a surrogate’s decision to 
withhold or withdraw life–sustaining 
procedures should not be based on 
a patient’s preexisting, long–term 
mental or physical disability [HCDA 
§5–606(c)(3)]. 
Mrs. Green appears to meet the 
end-stage definition based on the 
description of how her Alzheimer’s 
disease has progressed. The first 
step in an ethics consultation would 
be to find out whether Mrs. Green’s 
physician agrees that Mrs. Green 
meets this definition, and if so, 
whether two-physicians have certified 
that Mrs. Green is in an end-stage 
condition. (It would also help to visit 
Mrs. Green to confirm that how she 
presents is consistent with others’ 
descriptions.) The HCDA provides 
direction for who is considered the 
legally authorized decision-maker. 
The hierarchy order among family 
members (assuming there is no 
appointed guardian; we know there is 
no health care agent) is: 




5. Friend or other relative who 
knows the patient well.
For a friend or “other relative” to 
make decisions for Mrs. Green, an 
affidavit would need to be presented 
to the attending physician stating that 
the person is a relative or close friend 
of the patient who has maintained 
regular contact with the patient 
and is “familiar with the patient’s 
activities, health, and personal 
beliefs” [HCDA §5–606(a)(3)(ii)
(2)]. For the purposes of this analysis, 
let’s assume there is consensus 
10  Mid-Atlantic Ethics Committee Newsletter
among Mrs. Green’s family members 
(including whomever is designated 
as the authorized decision-maker 
according to the above hierarchy) 
that her life should not be prolonged 
by any means. It may be helpful to 
review the HCDA’s guidance for 
surrogates – specifically, that “[a]ny 
person authorized to make health care 
decisions for another … shall base 
those decisions on the wishes of the 
patient” (i.e., “substituted judgment”), 
which requires consideration of the 
patient’s:
• current diagnosis and prognosis 
with and without the treatment 
at issue;
• expressed preferences 
regarding the provision of, or 
the withholding or withdrawal 
of, the specific treatment at 
issue or of similar treatments;
• relevant religious and moral 
beliefs and personal values;
• behavior, attitudes, and past 
conduct with respect to the 
treatment at issue and medical 
treatment generally;
• reactions to the provision of, or 
the withholding or withdrawal 
of, a similar treatment for 
another individual; and
• expressed concerns about 
the effect on the family or 
intimate friends of the patient 
if a treatment were provided, 
withheld, or withdrawn [HCDA 
§5–606(c)(2)(i-vi)].
The case study lacks detail 
regarding whether Mrs. Green’s 
family thought through these 
considerations. They seem to be 
basing their request to withhold 
antibiotics on their appraisal of 
her poor quality of life, perhaps 
concluding that she would be 
better off dead than in her present 
diminished condition. This is a kind 
of “best interest” consideration, 
which the HCDA instructs surrogates 
to employ “if the wishes of the patient 
are unknown or unclear.” Thus, the 
ethics consultant(s) should remind 
the family (and authorized decision-
maker in particular) of the important 
task of using substituted judgment to 
inform medical decision-making for 
Mrs. Green. 
The next question that arises is 
whether, absent an advance directive, 
it would be likely that Mrs. Green’s 
family would know what her wishes 
were regarding use of antibiotics in 
her current situation. A decision to 
withhold CPR attempts or dialysis 
carries a different risk-benefit analysis 
than use of antibiotics. Antibiotics 
may, for example, improve comfort 
if they prevent or treat an infection 
that increases suffering. While 
health care professionals often share 
stories of patients who were kept 
alive by medical technology only to 
face a prolonged and painful dying 
process, does use of antibiotics fall in 
this category? It is worth exploring 
whether the family’s concern is truly 
her comfort and quality of life or in 
finding an opportunity for her to “die 
sooner rather than later.” This doesn’t 
mean it’s wrong to conclude that Mrs. 
Green would prefer to die sooner 
rather than later, or even that dying 
sooner would be in her best interest. 
Rather, it’s important to consider the 
burdens and benefits of antibiotic 
use and ensure that decision-making 
is consistent with best available 
evidence and facts, Mrs. Green’s 
wishes (if known), and the goals of 
care for her. 
Absent an advance directive and 
clear indication of Mrs. Green’s 
wishes, it would be difficult to 
support goals of care that prioritized 
hastening her death over maintaining 
her comfort. For example, if Mrs. 
Green was moaning and wincing 
when the leg with the abscess was 
moved and physicians felt that 
treating the abscess would improve 
her comfort but the family insisted 
on withholding the antibiotic with the 
goal of hastening her death, it would 
be appropriate for the physicians to 
challenge this. Providing palliative 
care at the end of life is a medical 
standard and it’s right for physicians 
to advocate for this. However, if that 
was not the case (e.g., Mrs. Green did 
not seem to be uncomfortable and/
or the antibiotics seemed to cause 
other uncomfortable side effects), 
the ethics consultant(s) should elicit 
more information about the basis of 
the physicians’ concerns. Do they feel 
they would be complicit in hastening 
her death? Do they fear that state 
surveyors may sanction them for not 
treating an infection? Do they fear 
litigation from the family? According 
to Maryland’s HCDA, a physician 
“who acts in accordance with the 
recommendation of the [patient care 
advisory] committee is not subject to 
liability for any claim based on lack 
of consent or authorization for the 
action” [HCDA §5–606(b)]. What’s 
“legal” and “ethical” is grounded in 
what is considered “good medicine.” 
In this case, applying the legal and 
ethical standards should reveal the 
path forward. A decision to withhold 
antibiotics for Mrs. Green (as well 
as other potentially life-prolonging 
interventions) should be based on a 
thoughtful consideration of what she 
would want and what would provide 
the most benefit and least burden to 
her. 
Anita J. Tarzian, PhD, RN
MHECN Program Coordinator
Ethics & Research Consultant
Baltimore, MD
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CALENDAR OF EVENTS
AUGUST
10-12- Conflict Resolution and Clinical-Setting Mediation for 
Healthcare, sponsored by the Center for Conflict Resolution in 
Healthcare LLC, Memphis, TN. Visit: http://www.healthcare-
mediation.net/trainings.html. 
17-20- Intensive Workshop in Conflict Resolution, sponsored by 
The Penn Program in Clinical Conflict Management, Perelman 
School of Medicine, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 
PA. For more information, contact: fiester@upenn.edu.
SEPTEMBER
7- Florida Ethics: Debates, Decisions, Solutions: 25th Annual 
Conference, sponsored by The University of Miami Institute 
for Bioethics and Health Policy, Miami, FL. Visit: http://www.
bioethics.net/events/florida-ethics-debates-decisions-solutions-
25th-annual-conference/. 
11-13- Ethical Leadership for Tomorrow's Health Care 
Organizations, sponsored by The Aspen Program for Ethical 
Healthcare Leadership, Miami, FL. Visit: http://fbn.med.miami.
edu/.
14-15- 7th Annual Western Michigan University Medical 
Humanities Conference, sponsored by the Fetzer Center, 
Western Michigan University, Kalamazoo, MI. Visit: http://
www.wmich.edu/medicalhumanities/events/conference2017. 
15- Building an “Inclusive Climate”: Addressing “ism” Issues 
in the Workplace in Trying Times, 2017 Judy Levy Ethics 
Workshop sponsored by The Kennedy Krieger Institute Social 
Work Department, The Shepard Pratt Conference Center, 
Towson, MD. Contact: SwannA@KennedyKrieger.org.  
OCTOBER
9-11- A Virtual Conference on Refugee & Migrant Health, 
Mobility, Human Rights & Responsibilities. Visit: https://
resistingborders.com/. 
27-29- Crossing Disciplines: Strategies for Humanizing One 
Another, the 2017 Humanities in Medicine Symposium, 
Sponsored by the Dolores Jean Lavins Center for Humanities 
in Medicine at the Mayo Clinic, Rochester, MN. Visit: http://
mayoclinic.org. 
19-22- Journey to the Center of Bioethics and the Humanities, 
195y Annual Meeting of the American Society for Bioethics & 
Humanities, Kansas City, KS. Visit: http://www.asbh.org. 
NOVEMBER
2-3- The Medicalization of Poverty, Co-sponsored through the 
University of Illinois (Medicine, Law), University of Virginia 
(Medicine, Public Health, Biomedical Ethics) and the Carle 
Illinois College of Medicine, University of Illinois, Urbana-
Champaign. Visit:  https://law.illinois.edu/faculty-research/
specialty-programs/epstein-health-law-and-policy/. 
7- Transforming Substance Use Disorders - Fourth 
Annual Interprofessional Forum on Ethics and 
Religion in Health Care, sponsored by the Institute 
for Jewish Continuity; the University of Maryland 
Schools of Medicine, Nursing, Pharmacy, and 
Social Work; the UMB Graduate School, and the 
Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network at 
Maryland Carey Law. UMB’s Southern Management 
Corporation Campus Center, 621 W. Lombard St., 
Baltimore, MD. Visit: http://www.nursing.umaryland.
edu/academics/pe/events/ [Members eligible for 
MHECN member discount!]
RECURRING EVENTS
Johns Hopkins Berman Institute of Bioethics Seminar 
Series, either at Sheik Zayed Tower Chevy Chase 
Conference Center (1800 Orleans St.) or Feinstone 
Hall, E2030, Bloomberg School of Public Health (615 
N. Wolfe St.) Baltimore, MD. 12N-1:15PM. Visit: 
http://www.bioethicsinstitute.org/educationtraining-2/
seminar-series.
September 11- “Should Preference Surveys Measure 
Health?” Speaker: Dan Hausman, PhD,  Herbert 
A. Simon and Hilldale Professor, Department of 
Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison 
(Feinstone Hall)
September 25- Speaker: Shannon Sullivan, PhD, 
MA, Chair of Philosophy and Professor of Philosophy 
and Health Psychology at UNC Charlotte (Feinstone 
Hall)
October 9- Speaker: Joanna Radin, PhD, MS, 
Assistant Professor,  History of Medicine, of 
Anthropology and of History, Yale School of 
Medicine (Zayed Tower)
October 23- Speaker: Nicole Civita, JD, Assistant 
Director, Rian Fried Center for Sustainable 
Agriculture & Food Systems, Sterling College 
(Feinstone Hall)
November 13- Speaker: Nancy Berlinger, PhD, 
MDiv, Research Scholar, The Hastings Center 
(Feinstone Hall)
November 27- Speaker: Sean Aas, PhD, Senior 
Research Scholar, the Kennedy Institute of Ethics; 
Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Georgetown 
University (Zayed Tower)
December 11- Speaker: Robert Cook Deegan, MD, 
Research Professor in the Sanford School of Public 
Policy (Feinstone Hall)
The Maryland Healthcare Ethics Committee Network (MHECN) is a membership organization, established by the Law and 
Health Care Program at the University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. The purpose of MHECN is to facilitate 
and enhance ethical reflection in all aspects of decision making in health care settings by supporting and providing informational 
and educational resources to ethics committees serving health care institutions in the state of Maryland. The Network attempts to 
achieve this goal by:
• Serving as a resource to ethics committees as they investigate ethical dilemmas within their institution and as they strive to 
assist their institution act consistently with its mission statement;
• Fostering communication and information sharing among Network members;
• Providing educational programs for ethics committee members, other healthcare providers, and members of the general 
public on ethical issues in health care; and
• Conducting research to improve the functioning of ethics committees and ultimately the care of patients in Maryland.
MHECN appreciates the support of its individual and institutional members. MHECN also welcomes support from affiliate 
members who provide additional financial support.
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Baltimore, MD 21201
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